History ChannelYou assert that the cause for which we fight is a needless one. I dispute this assertion. I say we as a nation decided since the events of 911 to act more like adults on the world stage. Saddam presented a real threat.

Key Findings from The Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq's WMD

>>Saddam Hussein so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.

>>* Saddam totally dominated the Regime's strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq's strategic policy.

>>* Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections-to gain support for lifting sanctions-with his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

>>* The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad's economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.

>>* By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html#sect
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD

You should read this report, required reading for anyone who whishes to take a hard look at the facts.

Saddam had been trying to game the U.N. right from the very beginning. We thought after The Gulf War since we did not have U.N. authority to topple him, we could safely leave him in place. (At the time I disagreed with that decision.) We believed it likely that Iraqis would rise up against him and that we did not need to worry about him. Then to our shame, when the Iraqis did rise up, we did not support them. Would you have been one of those that said who are we to interfere in Iraq, when Saddam was gassing the Kurds? We should have supported them, what say you?

To continue with Saddam, he had come within striking distance of his goal.

>>Saddam had long refused to accept the option of exporting oil with constraints on revenues. He was concerned that, once started, the pressure on the Security Council to lift sanctions-his real goal-would be lifted.

>>* By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/transmittal.html
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD

Then we said this has got to stop. We decided that the only way to make it stop was to achieve regime change in Iraq. This decision was made during the Clinton Administration.

>> the American call for "regime change" in Iraq didn't start with George W. Bush. For that, we must return to the days of the 105th Congress, when Bill Clinton occupied the White House. Recall a piece of legislation dubbed the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998" (Public Law 105-338). Not only did it call for Saddam Hussein's ouster, it also spelled out the goal of replacing his regime with a democratic Iraq.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A59558-2003Mar7¬Found=true
A Course Set by Congress (washingtonpost.com)
The Clinton administration had not developed a plan on how to achieve this goal.

Then we had an election. Then 8 months after Bush's inauguration 911, a wake up call. We started to take Osama Bin Laden seriously. We went after him in Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban there that were giving him sanctuary. We now know for a fact that Saddam was giving sanctuary to Al Qaeda fleeing Afghanistan. The argument that Osama Bin Ladden would not ally with Saddam, can be demonstrated not to be taking Osama seriously. Saddam was playing footsie with Al Qaeda.

State Department's 2003 report on "Patterns of Global Terrorism"

>>The presence of several hundred al-Qaida operatives fighting with the small Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam in the northeastern corner of Iraqi Kurdistan--where the IIS operates--is well documented. Iraq has an agent in the most senior levels of Ansar al-Islam as well. In addition, small numbers of highly placed al-Qaida militants were present in Baghdad and areas of Iraq that Saddam controls. It is inconceivable these groups were in Iraq without the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam's regime. In the past year, al-Qaida operatives in northern Iraq concocted suspect chemicals under the direction of senior al-Qaida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and tried to smuggle them into Russia, Western Europe, and the United States for terrorist operations.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/
2003

>>Mounting evidence continues to link Saddam Hussein's former regime with foreign Islamic radicals. When coalition forces captured the Salman Pak training facility near Baghdad, signs of terrorist activity were found. According to General Vincent Brooks, "[Salman Pak] reinforces the likelihood of links between this regime and external terrorist organizations ... some [of the fighters trained] came from Sudan, some from Egypt." In addition, an Iraqi intelligence document has identified "the Saudi Osama bin Laden" on a list of "collaborators."
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/Issues2004/iraq.cfm#TP
Issues 2004 - Iraq



According to the September 11 report:

>>With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request ... [but] the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections. (p.61)

>>In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. (p.66)

>>Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States. (p.66)


And, on July 7, 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported:

>>That George Tenet provided the Senate Intelligence Committee this assessment in a closed session on September 17, 2002: "There is evidence that Iraq provided al Qaeda with various kinds of training--combat, bomb-making, [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] CBRN. Although Saddam did not endorse al Qaeda's overall agenda and was suspicious of Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain circumstances, to enhancing bin Laden's operational capabilities. As with much of the information on the overall relationship, details on training are [redacted] from sources of varying reliability."

>> That according to a CIA report called Iraqi Support for Terrorism, "the general pattern that emerges is one of al Qaeda's enduring interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) expertise from Iraq."

>> That the Iraqi regime 'certainly' had knowledge that Abu Musab al Zarqawi - described in Iraqi Support for Terrorism as "a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner" - was operating in Baghdad and northern Iraq.

Can we prove "operational cooperation" no. Due to the nature of our intelligence the only time we might have been able to do that, would have been after a catastrophic event within the United States. At which point:

>> all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html
President Delivers "State of the Union"